The Constitutionality of the Exercise of
Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities
Thirty-five states currently have statutes in force authorizing
some or all of their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental
powers beyond their corporate limits. These statutes characteristically allow controls over adjacent unincorporated areas by elected
municipal officials without providing for participation in the election of those officials by the residents of the unincorporated areas.
Throughout the history of extraterritorial government, residents of unincorporated areas have challenged this exercise of governmental power without representation. Nearly all such challenges
have failed. This comment reexamines the constitutionality of extramunicipal rule over unincorporated areas in light of modern
equal protection doctrine in the area of voting rights.
I.

CURRENT EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS

Authority for municipalities' to exercise governmental powers
outside their boundaries can be conferred only by the state.' States
that provide for "home rule" uniformly permit municipalities to
govern only within their corporate limits unless the state legislature3
has expressly granted supplemental extraterritorial authority.
States that concentrate authority in the state government enable
municipalities to exercise only powers that are delegated to them by
the state legislature.' Under either theory of state government, extraterritorial powers exist only by virtue of particular statutory
grants of power.
Extraterritorial government is usually justified on two
grounds.5 First, a city can protect its own residents by extending its
powers beyond its boundaries-for example, by zoning an unincorporated area abutting a single-family residential area for an identiI Theoretically, any municipal entity can be granted extraterritorial powers, but almost
all such grants have been to cities. A notable exception is South Dakota's delegation of
extraterritorial power to certain counties. See text and notes at notes 91-100 infra.
2 2 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1 10.07, at 751-52 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1966).
3 Id.
10.08, at 753-54.
Id. 10.09, at 754.
See, e.g., Anderson, The ExtraterritorialPowers of Cities (pt. 1), 10 MINN. L. REv. 475,
475 (1926); Bouwsma, The Validity of ExtraterritorialMunicipalZoning, 8 VAND. L. Rxv. 806,
807 (1955); Goodman, The Legal Basis of ExtraterritorialZoning in Oklahoma, 4 TULSA L.J.
21, 22 (1967); Melli & Devoy, ExtraterritorialPlanningand Urban Growth, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
55, 56.
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cal or compatible use. A second justification for the use of extraterritorial powers is protection of extramunicipal residents. Without extraterritorial government, adjacent unincorporated areas might lack
even the most elemental municipal services, such as police or fire
protection.
A few states enable municipalities to exercise the full range of
police power 6 in adjacent unincorporated areas, but the majority
delegate only some portion of the police power for extraterritorial
exercise. The various delegations can be classified into five categories.
A. 'Delegations of Full Police Powers
Four states grant some or all of their cities complete police
powers over abutting unincorporated areas. 7 Idaho's statute, for
example, empowers certain cities to control unincorporated areas
within one mile of their corporate limits "in all matters . . . except
taxation. '" North Dakota9 and South Dakota"0 grant similar
authority over areas within one-half and one mile, respectively, of
city limits. In Alabama, unincorporated territory within as much as
three miles of a city is subject to the city's "police jurisdiction.""
B.

Regulatory Authority

Many states permit their cities, or some of them, to exercise
regulatory or prohibitory control over certain kinds of extramural
activity. Most commonly, this kind of delegation empowers cities to
prohibit or regulate offensive industries within a certain distance of
the city limits. 12 In some states, the statute suggests the kinds of

' In the major treatise on municipal corporations, McQuillin describes the police
as "the power to govern men and things," 6 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS
at 467 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1969) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877)), and
power to "govern the movement, acts, and words of persons and the use of things
corporate area." Id.
I ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 50-606 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §
01(2) (1968); S.D.
IDAHO CODE

COMPILED LAWS ANN.

power
24.02,
as the
in the

40-06-

§ 9-29-1 (1967).

§ 50-606 (1967).

N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-06-01(2) (1968) (granting power over areas within one-half mile
of the city for enforcement of "police regulations and ordinances adopted to promote the
peace, order, safety, and general welfare of the community").
1

S.D.

COMPILED LAWS ANN.

§ 9-29-1 (1967) (granting power over areas within one mile

of any city or city-owned public ground or park to exercise jurisdiction "for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community").
" This jurisdiction extends a mile and a half beyond city limits if the city has a population under 6,000, and three miles if the city's population is larger than 6,000. ALA. CODE §
11-40-10 (1975). See text and notes at notes 101-114 infra.
12ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-240-B-21(c) (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 310 (1974); ILL.
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activities it is intended to affect. For instance, the Arizona statute
covers "slaughterhouses, tanneries, soap factories, establishments
for the steaming or rendering of tallow, lard, or offal, and all other
establishments or places where any nauseous, offensive, or unwholesome business may be carried on" within two miles of a city. 3 Other
states simply empower cities to suppress nuisances in certain areas,
without providing any indication what is to be considered a nuisance. 4
A different approach used in some states is to make ordinances
on specified subjects applicable extraterritorially. Thus, four states
grant extraterritorial authority over some aspects of land use, such
as zoning or building codes, 15 two permit the punishment of disorderly conduct (as defined by city ordinance)," and two authorize
17
municipal authorities to suppress prostitution.
Four states grant their cities the power to license, regulate, or
prohibit various forms of amusement beyond their borders. 8 The
Oregon statute even permits cities to hire the Portland Boxing and
Wrestling Commission to regulate those activities. Once a city hires
the Commission, its authority extends to the entire county in which
the hiring city lies."
Montana and Wyoming permit extraterritorial regulation of
explosives,20 and Missouri still permits its cities to license
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-9 (Smith-Hurd 1962); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-1-1.5-6(d) (Burns 1974);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-944 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-11 (1976); UTAH CODEANN.
§ 10-8-66 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.052 (West 1965 & Supp. 1977). See also Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 80.090(5) (Vernon 1952) (regulation of dram shops and places of amusement within onehalf mile of city limits).
" ARIz. REV. STAT. § 9-240-B-21(c) (Supp. 1975).
' IDAHO CODE § 50-334 (1967); KAN. STAT. § 13-1417 (1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, §
2(23) (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 94.2 (West 1967); NED. REV. STAT. J 14-103 (1974). See also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.22.280(22) (1965).
11FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.175 (West 1972) (city extraterritorial authority subject to agreement with county; "equitable representation" of extramural residents required on relevant
commissions and boards); NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-901 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(2) (West 1957).
, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2(23) (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-927 (Supp. 1977).
* COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-401(1)(g) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-41 (1973).
11 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 80.090(5) (Vernon 1952) (to license, regulate, or prohibit "public
shows, circuses, theatrical and other amusements"); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-918 (including the power to "license, tax, and regulate circuses and shows of like character"), 11921 ("to regulate or prohibit dance houses"), and 11-973 (1968) ("to prevent and prohibit
prize fights, boxing matches of any kind"); OR. REv. STAT. § 463.120 (1953) (to regulate
boxing and wrestling); WASH. REv. CODE § 35.24.2900(7) (1965) (to license "shows, exhibitions, and lawful games").
" OR. REV. STAT. §§ 463.115-120 (1953).
2 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-932 (1968) (storage of gunpowder, other explosives, tar,
pitch, kerosene, oils, and turpentine may be regulated or prevented); Wvo. STAT. § 15.1-3(26)
(1965) (storage or use of same may be prevented, restrained, or regulated).
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"dramshops and tippling houses" beyond their limits. 2'
C.

Health and Sanitary Regulations

Eighteen states 22 enable municipalities to exercise various degrees of control over health and sanitary conditions in nearby unincorporated areas. Thirteen states 23 give city councils or boards of
health chosen by city councils the power to create and enforce quarantine rules. A number of states provide for both extramural control
of sanitary conditions and enforcement of quarantines.24
The general power to regulate health conditions encompasses
the power to control pollution and refuse disposal. Wisconsin specifically empowers its cities to control areas "where refuse, rubbish,
ashes or garbage shall be dumped . . . within one mile" of city
limits z Another Wisconsin statute enables cities to "regulate or
prohibit the emission of dense smoke . . . within . . one mile" of
26
its boundaries.
Another aspect of the general power to control health conditions
is the power to regulate or prohibit cemeteries near a city.27 Several
of these cemetery statutes illustrate the obsolescence and bad
draftsmanship that characterize many delegations of extraterrito2, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 80.090(5) (Vernon 1952) (license, regulate, or prohibit dramshops
and tippling houses).
22 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-240-B-20(b) (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-204 (Repl. Vol.
1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-702 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 50-606 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 24, § 7-4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); IND. CODE § 18-1-1.5-7 (Burns 1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
94.1 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-946 (1968); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-103 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-6(B) (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-0601(2) (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 666 (West 1959); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1015(2) (Vernon 1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-61 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280(21)
(Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.052(2) (West 1965); Wyo. STAT. § 35.377 (1957).
23 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 9-240-B-20(b) (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-204 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 50-606 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); IND. CODE §§ 18-11.5-6(d) & 18-1-1.5-7(a), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) (Bums 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
94.1 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-19-3 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-946 (1968); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-103 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-06-01(2) (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 666 (West 1959); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1015(2) (Vernon 1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §
10-8-61 (1973).
21 See IDAHO CODE § 50-606 (1967) ("health or quarantine"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 74-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962) ("health and quarantine"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-06-01(2) (1968)
("health and quarantine"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-61 (1973) ("health. . . and. . . quarantine").
25 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.052(2) (West 1965).
2 Id. § 146.10 (West 1974).
21 Eight states specifically permit extraterritorial cemetery regulation. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 31-25-702 (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-1-1.5-7(h) (Burns 1974); MoNr. REv. CODES
ANN. § 11-948 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-241 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-6 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-62 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.22.280(21), 35.23.440(51)
(1965); Wyo. STAT. § 35.377 (1957).
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rial governing authority. Wyoming, for example, requires only that
a cemetery be "near" a city to come within its jurisdiction, 21 and
Utah purports to grant its cities control over any cemetery in which
2
their dead are buried. 1
D.

Zoning Regulations

Eighteen 31 or nineteen 31 states permit some or all of their cities
to zone adjacent unincorporated areas. Although these statutes differ, in every case the zoning power conferred is identical within and
without the city limits.
A few statutes authorizing extramunicipal zoning provide for
some representation of persons residing in the affected unincorporated area .32 In Iowa, for example, two representatives of the unincorporated area must be appointed by the county board of supervisors
to serve on the city planning commission if the city zones beyond
the city limits. This attempt to provide some representation in the
zoning process is rather half-hearted, however, because the county
supervisors need not appoint the representatives until after the extraterritorial zoning ordinance has been drafted.3 3 Furthermore,
21 Wyo. STAT. 4 35.377 (1957). Nebraska has a law of similar effect. NEB. REV. STAT. §
16-241 (1974).
2 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-62 (1973). "[Cities] may . . . have and exercise police jurisdiction . . . over any cemetery used by the inhabitants of the city.
... See also the
Washington statute on the subject, WASH. REv. CODE § 23.440(51) (1965), granting to second
class cities, as defined by WASH. REV. CODE § 35.01.020 (1965) as cities of not less than 10,000
in population, the power "[t]o regulate the burial of the dead and to establish and regulate
cemeteries, within or without the corporate limits . .. ."
11 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-240-B-21(c) (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2827 (1968); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 163.175 (West 1972); IDAHO CODE, § 67-6526 (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
24, § 11-31-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND. CODE § 18-7-5-34 (Bums 1974); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 414.23 (West 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 100.131 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.36 (1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-2702(2) (Supp.
1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 16-901, 14-418 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-20-2(B) (1976); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-35-02 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-609
(1971); W. VA. CODE § 8-24-71 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7a) (West Supp. 1976).
31 A nineteenth, arguably, is South Carolina. Although no statute of the state explicitly
grants cities the power to zone extraterritorially, one, S.C. CODE § 5-23-580 (1977), gives
municipal planning commissions jurisdiction over subdivisions of all land within three miles
of the municipality. A second, S.C. CODE § 5-23-490 (1977), gives these planning commissions
the power to include territory outside city limits in the master city plan. The commissions
also have authority over the building of new streets in territory within three miles of the city
limits. S.C. CODE § 5-23-600 (1977). The extraterritorial powers of the commissions are,
however, limited by S.C. CODE § 5-23-740 (1977) solely to "the matter of planning and laying
out new streets in new subdivisions."
32 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 9-461.11(c) (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.175 (West 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.23 (West 1976); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 11-2702(2) (Supp. 1977);

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 660A-362 (1976).

' A municipality, during the time its zoning jurisdiction is extended under this
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appointment of two non-city representatives may not result in proportional representation of non-city interests. More importantly,
the planning commission has only an advisory function; zoning ordinances must actually be enacted by the city council, on which residents of the unincorporated area are not represented.3 Other states'
provisions for representation of non-city interests in the zoning pro35
cess are similarly flawed.
E.

Platting and Subdivision Regulation

Instead of or in addition to zoning regulation, twenty-four
states require city approval for extramunicipal subdivisions or for
platting extramunicipal land. 3 These statutes typically require
approval of a city agency before a landowner may subdivide or
record a plat or property. In some states that agency is the planning
3
commission; in others approval of the city council is required.
The primary purpose of subdivision regulation appears to be
prevention of fraud, 38 but the effects of such regulation can be simisection, shall increase the size of its planning and zoning commission and its board of
adjustment each by two members. The additional members shall be residents of the area
outside the city limits over which the zoning jurisdiction is extended ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.23 (West 1976) (emphasis added).
3' See IOWA CODE ANN. 44 414.4 & 414.6 (West 1976).
' The statutory schemes of Arizona and Montana are similar to Iowa's, except that they
provide for addition of two extramunicipal representatives to the planning council before the
extramunicipal area is zoned. The problems of malapportionment and the council's advisory
nature remain. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-461.11 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-2702(2)
(Supp. 1976).
-1 ALA. CODE §§ 11-52-30, 11-52-31 (1977); AIz. REV. STAT. § 9-474 (Supp. 1975); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 31-23-212 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.175(1), 177.071 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 50-1360 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-12-5(1) (Smith-Hurd
1962); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-5-47 (Bums 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 409.1, 409.7 (West Repl.
Vol. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 12-705 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.131 (1970); MD. ANN. CODE art.
66B, § 5.01 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.36, 125.43 (1970); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 11-2702(2), 3305 (1968 & Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-116 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-18-5 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.09 (Page
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1423 (West 1959); OR. REv. STAT. § 227.110(1) (1975); S.C.
CODE §§ 5-23-580, 5-23-590 (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-3-6 & 11-6-26 (1967); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 974(a) (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 39-1-16 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.10(b) (West 1957). The statutes of New Hampshire are ambiguous on
whether extraterritorial plat or subdivision approval is authorized. Only power to include
extramunicipal territory in master plans is specifically mentioned. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
36-13, 36-19 (1970).
1,FLA. STAT. ANN. § 177.071 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 50-1306 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 14-116 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(b) (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-3-6
& 11-6-26 (1967); W. VA. CODE § 39-1-16 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.10(b) (West 1957).
31 Bartelt, ExtraterritorialZoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 367,
394 n.89 (1957). See also Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 H~Av. L. REV. 1226, 1231 (1952).
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lar to the effects of zoning laws. 39 A city may require, for example,
that subdivided lots be of a certain minimum size, or may demand
dedication of a percentage of the subdivided property for public
parks, schools, or streets. In most states, no representation is afforded residents of the unincorporated area, although in those states
which require representation on the city planning commission if the
city exercises extraterritorial zoning power, the same commission
also regulates extraterritorial subdivision and platting.
F.

Summary

The five varieties of extraterritorial powers share several features. Each permits elected city officials to pass ordinances affecting areas outside their constituencies and thus denies residents of
those areas any political representation in matters affecting them
directly. In all instances the power wielded by the elected officials
derives from the police power of the state and is supported by the
power of municipal officials (usually city councils) to authorize fines
or incarceration to ensure compliance. In short, each of the types of
delegated police power involves the exercise of governmental power
over citizens who have no political influence over the exercise of that
power.
II.

EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATIONS

OF EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS

Statutory schemes involving the delegation of extraterritorial
police power to cities are not of recent origin; most of the enabling
statutes have direct antecedents dating from the end of the last
century. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century the power
of state legislatures to delegate extraterritorial powers was unquestioned. 0 Dillon's noted treatise on municipal corporations, first
published in 1872, enunciated the central proposition-later known
as "Dillon's Rule"-that cities are creatures of legislative convenience, whose powers and jurisdictions could be altered or destroyed
by legislative action.4 Although some jurists, notably Judge
Cooley,4 2 espoused the notion that Americans had an inherent or
3' Bartelt, supra note 38 at 394-96; Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HA.v. L. REv.
1226, 1227 (1952).
10See, e.g., Harrison v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264 (Md. 1843)

(upholding an ordinance with potential for extraterritorial application).
11J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS § 30, at 71-73 (1st ed. 1872).
42 See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 98 (1871) (Cooley, J.); People ex
rel. Park Comm'rs v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 228 (1873) (Cooley, J.). Cooley's position
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common-law right to self-government, the courts never accepted
this view.13 Later scholarly treatment of municipal corporations also
relied on the foundation laid by Dillon. In the first extensive work
on extramunicipal powers, published in 1926, political science professor William Anderson agreed with Dillon and stated that cities,
as agents of the state, may exercise such authority as the state
chooses to delegate." Anderson articulated two additional arguments supporting delegation of extraterritorial powers: judicial
45
rejection of Cooley's notion of an inherent right to self-government,
and the implicit consent of non-city residents, through their representatives in the state legislature, to delegations of extraterritorial
4
powers. 1
The courts almost universally rejected challenges to the constitutionality of extraterritorial delegations. The first case to consider
a due process challenge, Board of Trustees v. Watson,47 is fairly
typical. In Watson, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected a claim
that the imposition of a license fee on a liquor retailer by a town in
which he neither resided nor voted deprived him of property without
due process.4 The court held that because the state could validly
exercise the police power over the sale of liquor, it could delegate
that power "to the local government of the community immediately
interested. '4 Subsequent due process challenges to extraterritorial
regulation in other states also failed.5
was shared by Judge Eugene McQuillin. In his influential treatise on municipal corporations,
Judge McQuillin stated that the right to local self-government derived from unwritten
"fundamental principles." 1 E. McQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 70 (1st ed. 1911). But
see 1 E. McQuILIN, MUNICIPAL CORPOATONS § 1.42 at 52 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1971): "[I]t seems
that the doctrine of the existence of an inherent right of local self-government. . . does not
at present exist, and according to some authorities never did exist in this country."
13See, e.g., Robb v. City of Indianapolis, 38 Ind. 49 (1871).
1 Anderson, The ExtraterritorialPowers of Cities (pt. 2), 10 MINN. L. REv. 564, 580
(1926).
45Id. at 580-81 (citing McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local SelfGovernment (pts. 1-2), 16 CoLuM. L. Ray. 190, 299 (1916)).
1' "If the consent of the governed is a prerequisite to a valid act of legislation, that
consent has been given by the [non-city] voters' representatives in the legislature." Id. at
581.
More recent commentators have reiterated Anderson's rationales. See, e.g., Bartelt,
ExtraterritorialZoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32 NoTaE DAME LAW. 367, 400-02 (1957);
Bouwsma, The Validity of ExtraterritorialMunicipalZoning, 8 VAD. L. REv. 806, 814 (1955);
Goodman, The Legal Basis of ExtraterritorialZoning in Oklahoma, 4 TULsA L.J. 21, 27 (1967).
Goodman seems also to suggest that the public would revolt if delegations of unreasonable
extraterritorial powers were made, and that the absence of such a revolt currently evidences
the eminent reasonableness and constitutionality of existing delegations. Id. at 27-28.
4 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 660 (1869).
41The claim was based on the due process clause in the state constitution.
4, 68 Ky. at 662.
See, e.g., White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932) (challenging
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The cases did suggest, however, a single due process limitation
5
on extraterritorial governance. Beginning with the Watson case, '
courts drew a distinction between the extraterritorial imposition of
license fees, which was permissible, and extraterritorial taxation,
which was not5z The distinction was usually justified on the ground
that taxes benefit only the town, whereas licensing and license fees
3
benefit extraterritorial residents as well.1
In only one major case did a court strike down a delegation of
extraterritorial powers on due process grounds. In Malone v.
Williams,5" Tennessee's highest court invalidated a statute that replaced the major elected officials of the city of Memphis with legislative appointees and gave the appointees vastly increased extraterritorial powers. 5 The Malone court added a limiting gloss to tradiextraterritorial business license tax); Jordan v. City of Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N.E. 544
(1904) (liquor regulation); Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58
(1961) (zoning); State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912) (sanitary regulations); City
Transportation Co. v. Pharr, 186 Tenn. 217, 209 S.W.2d 15 (1948) (regulation of a bus line);
Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965) (zoning). In each
case the court held that the challenged statutory scheme did not violate the constitutional
guarantees of due process.
11 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 660 (1869).
52 See, e.g., Atlantic Oil Co. v. Town of Steele, 283 Ala. 56, 214 So. 2d 331 (1968); City
of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 17 So. 2d 451 (1944); Wells v. City of Weston, 22
Mo. 384 (1856). See also Patterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956),
in which the court upheld enforcement of extraterritorial subdivision regulations against the
plaintiff's contention that the dedication requirements included in the subdivision regulations amounted to taxation, thus violating the state constitution's guarantee of uniformity
in taxation. The court drew the distinction between taxation and the regulatory power, held
the subdivision regulation was within the latter, and permitted enforcement of the ordinance.
Id. at 248, 137 N.E.2d at 380.
s3 The due process distinction between taxing and licensing is questionable, because in
either case the effect of city action is the same: non-city residents must pay without having
had the opportunity to vote for the government which sets the level of payment.
If a license fee were set so high that it was clearly a revenue rather than a police matter,
a court might declare the fee unconstitutional as an extraterritorial tax. But the question of
when a license fee becomes a tax is not easily answered, as the opinion in City of Prichard v.
Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 17 So. 2d 451 (1944), demonstrates:
We have carefully examined the evidence both as to the amount of revenue derived from
the ordinances and as to the cost and amount of regulation, fire, and police protection. . . . Suffice it to say that we conclude the trial court had the right to find that
under this evidence the revenue exacted by the ordinances was all out of proportion to
the cost of regulation and protection and therefore that the licenses imposed on businesses outside the city amounted to taxation for revenue. As demonstrated . . . such
taxation is unconstitutional.
245 Ala. at 370, 17 So. 2d at 455. See also Town of Graysville v. Johnson, 33 Ala. App. 479,
34 So. 2d 708 (1948).
s' 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
The vehicle for these changes was an amendment to the Memphis city charter which
named the new officers and enumerated their powers. Id. at 406-11, 103 S.W. at 802-03.
Among the powers delegated to the new city government were the power to abate nuisances
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tional doctrine. The court noted that, as a matter of necessity, a
limited police power over "a small section" of the surrounding countryside could be granted in order to protect the city's residents from
nuisances and health hazards. 6 Such grants rest, the court stated,
upon the theory that the municipality is the state's agent for the
purpose of protecting the people of the state. 57 Nevertheless, the
court held that the necessity justification for granting such powers
defined its limits and could not conceive of any necessity for extending all the governmental or police powers extraterritorially or for
extending such powers any great distance beyond the city boundaries.58
Thus, the single case invalidating extraterritorial government
on due process grounds suggests only a limitation on its scope. Perhaps because of the vagueness of the "necessity" limitation, 9 no
case since Malone has held extramunicipal governance violative of
due process. 0
Im.

SOURCE OF THE NEW CHALLENGE: EQUAL PROTECTION

The early substantive due process attacks on extraterritorial
powers focused on the fact of their exercise. The modern Supreme
within ten miles of the city, id. at 416-17, 103 S.W. at 805; to establish quarantine zones in
the same area, id. at 419, 103 S.W. at 805; to "prohibit ...
pigpens, cow stables, [and]
dairies" within the corporate limits and for two miles beyond, id.; and to exercise "all
governmental and police powers" within that area, id. at 420, 103 S.W. at 806.
41 Id. at 420, 103 S.W. at 806.
$7 Id.
Id. at 420-21, 103 S.W. at 806.
' The Malone court found the ten-mile quarantine jurisdiction unobjectionable, id. at
419, 103 S.W. at 805-06, but struck down the ten-mile jurisdiction over nuisances, id. at 418,
103 S.W. at 805; the two-mile jurisdiction over pigpens, cow stables, and dairies, id. at 419,
103 S.W. at 806; and the two-mile jurisdiction for the exercise of governmental and police
powers, id. at 419-20, 103 S.W. at 806.
SO One court indicated in dictum that it might find a grant of extraterritorial regulatory
powers unconstitutional as a violation of due process. It managed, however, to put aside "the
grave constitutional questions involved" and decide the case on the basis of statutory interpretation. Hollis v. Parkland Corp., 120 Tex. 531, 537, 40 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1931) (discussing a
city's extraterritorial plat approval jurisdiction).
Other state courts have struck down grants of extraterritorial powers after Malone, but
in each of these cases, the challenge was based on some idiosyncratic feature of the state's
constitution rather than on due process grounds. See, e.g., Ball v. Peavey, 210 Ga. 575, 82
S.E.2d 143 (1954) (delegations of extraterritorial powers in city charters violate state constitution's provision that each legislative act must deal with only one subject clearly named in its
title); Blair v. State, 90 Ga. 326, 17 S.E. 96 (1892) (same); Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc.,
139 Mont. 263, 362 P.2d 1021 (1961) (delegation of power to counties to zone outside city
limits in cooperation with nearby cities violated Montana constitution, which denies legislative power to county governments). But see State v. Schroeder, 51 Iowa 197, 1 N.W. 431 (1879)
(rejecting argument made in Ball and Blair).
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Court's foray into voting rights issues under the authority of the
Equal Protection Clause, however, raises the question whether the
exercise of such powers by elective entities unconstitutionally denies
equal voting rights to affected non-residents.
A. Extension of Equal Protection Voting Rights Doctrine to
Municipal Entities
Legislative distinctions among citizens for the purposes of voting rights are subject to the "strict scrutiny" test" of equal protection because, as the Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims,"2 "The right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights. 8' 3 The strict scrutiny
test was initially employed in cases concerning voting rights in
connection with state and federal elections. 4 In the 1968 case of
Avery v. Midland County,65 the Court made it clear that local electoral laws are also subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Avery was an
apportionment case in which residents of a county's only urban area
complained that they were permitted to elect only two of the five
members of the county's legislative organ, 6 even though the urban
residents comprised about 95% of the county's population. The
Court held that the Constitution does not permit local government
units to vary substantially from equal population in electoral districting:
[I]t is now beyond question that a State's political subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. The actions of local government are the actions of the State. A city,
town, or county may no more deny the equal protection of the
laws than it may abridge freedom of speech ....
For an explanation and criticism of the emergence of the "compelling state interest"
or "strict scrutiny" test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-63 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 59-78.
.2 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
,0Id. at 562. See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1963) (Black., J.) ("other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined"); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (Douglas, J.) ("The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter
. . .underlies many of our decisions").

" For examples of the earlier application of the strict scrutiny test to voter restrictions
in state and federal elections, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
- 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
" The county's legislative organ was composed of five members, one of whom was elected
from the county at large. The other four members were chosen from the four districts, in one
of which was located "virtually the entire city of Midland." 390 U.S. at 476.
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. . . [W]hen the state delegates lawmaking power to local
government and provides for the election of local officials from
districts specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it
must insure that those qualified to vote have an equally effective voice in the election process.67
The Court in Avery emphatically rejected the argument that
malapportionment at the local level was acceptable because countenanced by a properly apportioned state legislature, 8 an argument
akin to the "implied consent" theory used to justify extraterritorial
delegations to municipalities.69 Given the quantum and importance
of decisionmaking that takes place at the local level, the Court saw
no significant difference, for equal protection purposes, "between
the exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by
elected officials in cities, towns, and counties."7 0
Avery applied the equal protection clause to condemn the dilution of votes in cases involving local governmental entities with
general powers. After Avery the Court further extended the constitutional voting rights doctrine to cases of exclusion from the franchise and to cases in which the local unit possessed very limited
governmental powers.
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 157' the Court
applied the Reynolds principle to a special purpose unit election and
settled several important issues concerning the scope of constitutional electoral limitations. The plaintiffs in Kramer lived within
the boundaries of the defendant school district, but were prevented
by property requirements from voting in school board elections.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, declared that the need
for close judicial scrutiny of voter classifications is not affected simply because the political entity does not have "general" legislative
powers: "Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident
citizens are permitted to participate and some are not. 7 2 Thus,
although the Court in Avery had hinted that special units not having "general governmental powers" might be permitted to deviate
17Id.

at 480 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

65 Id. at 481.
63 See text and note at note 46 supra; Anderson, supra note 44, at 580-81; Bartelt, supra
note 38, at 400-02; Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land
Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 40 n.95; Bouwsma, supra note 46, at 814; Goodman,
supra; note 46, at 27.
70 390 U.S. at 481 (footnote omitted).
7, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
72 Id. at 629.
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substantially from the one-man, one-vote ideal, 73 Kramerholds that
equal protection brooks no such limitation. Moreover, the Court
stated, the need for strict scrutiny is not limited to apportionment
statutes which may dilute citizens' votes; "[n]o less rigid an
examination" is to be applied to classifications that deny the
franchise. 7 Lastly, the Court in Kramer resolved an issue that the
decision-if not the logic-in Avery had left open and rejected the
argument that the state was free to grant the voting privilege to
whomever it pleased because the school board could have been appointed rather than elected. The constitutional problem, the Court
responded, inheres not in the denial of the franchise but in differential treatment: "[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the equal pro'75
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court in Kramer rejected the notion that the equal protection clause does not apply to local municipal enterprises which exercise less than full governmental powers, but left unclear the extent
of the class of municipal activities subject to the fourteenth amendment "voting rights" doctrine. After Kramer, plaintiffs successfully
attacked inequalities in voting rights in other types of special purpose districts. For example, Supreme Court decisions expanded the
franchise in public utility bond issue referenda, 7 and, in Hadley v.
Junior College District,77 applied the one-person, one-vote rule to a
junior college district. The Hadley Court, however, recognized that
"there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental
activities and so disproportionately affect different groups"7 that
the Reynolds principle would not apply. This nongovernmental/disproportionate impact limit was reached in the case of Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District.79 The Supreme Court in Salyer applied the standard suggested in Hadley
390 U.S. at 485.
395 U.S. at 626.
7' Id. at 629 (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)). See
also Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970). The Court has never indicated,
however, that a state must create local governments by election rather than appointment.
1' Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional a statute
allowing only property owners to vote in municipal utility's referendum authorizing revenue
bonds). See also City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (extending Ciprianoto
municipal referendum authorizing issuance of general obligation bonds).
77 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
7AId. at 56.
7' 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973); Note, Property Qualificationsfor Voting in Special PurposeDistricts: Beyond the Scope of "One Man-One Vote," 59 CORNELL L. Rlv. 687 (1974).
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and approved a property limitation upon the right to vote for directors of a water storage and supply district that disenfranchised
numerous affected farmers.
B.

Evans v. Cornman: Geographical Classifications

The Avery and Kramerline of cases involved claims by citizens
residing within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity. In the 1970 case of Evans v. Cornman8° the Supreme Court ruled
that, under some circumstances, equal protection demands that a
governmental entity extend voting rights to persons whom the entity does not characterize as "residents."
The plaintiffs in Cornmanwere residents of a federal compound
within which the National Institutes of Health (NIH) were located.
Although surrounded by Montgomery County, Maryland, the compound was subject to the jurisdiction of the federal government. The
residents of the federal enclave paid no property taxes to the abutting local or county governments, although some sent their children
to local public schools. When state election officials refused to register NIH residents to vote, on the ground that they were not
"residents" of Maryland for purposes of its election laws, the residents secured a federal court injunction permitting them to vote.
On direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's holding that the denial of the vote denied the NIH residents
equal protection of the laws. Rejecting the argument that the NIH
residents were not bona fide "residents" of Maryland for voting
Aights purposes, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test.8' In support of the franchise limitation the state asserted a justification that
Kramer had suggested might suffice in some circumstances:8" "to
insure that only those citizens who are primarily or substantially
interested in or affected by electoral decisions have a voice in making them."' In examining the articulated state interest, the Court
cautioned that "such a claim cannot be lightly accepted. . . .All
too often, lack of a 'substantial interest' might mean no more than
a different interest . . ...8 The Court noted that NIH residents
were affected by Maryland electoral decisions in a number of ways.
Although federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the enclave,
398 U.S. 419 (1970).
s,Id. at 421-22.
12 395 U.S. at 631-33. "We need express no opinion as to whether the State in some
circumstances might limit the exercise of the franchise to those 'primarily interested' or
'primarily affected.'" Id. at 632.
11 398 U.S. at 422.
84Id. at 422-23 (citations omitted).
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the state's criminal laws were applicable by virtue of the Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act. 8 The residents had an interest in Maryland's spending and taxing decisions since Congress permits the
states to levy and collect state taxes-with the exception of property
taxes-on federal enclaves. 8 Residents were also subject to state
unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation laws, to
state automobile registration requirements, to the process and jurisdiction of state courts, and to the family laws of the state.8 7 The
differences of impact of state legislative decisions on Maryland residents and on enclave residents, the Court concluded, "do not come
close to establishing that degree of disinterest in electoral decisions
that might justify a total exclusion from the franchise." 8
Thus, although it remains true that citizens enjoy no inherent
right to local self-government,89 it is now apparent that once elective
government is established at the local level, all citizens affected by
the exercise of governmental power in roughly equivalent degree
have a right to whatever electoral franchise is granted. Voting rights
distinctions among citizens on the basis of geographic boundaries
are not justified unless the geographic exclusion reflects a significant difference in the extent of citizen interest in the unit's electoral
decisions or is necessary to achieve some other compelling state
interest.

IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
POWERS

The validity of grants of extraterritorial powers to local governments has not been generally reconsidered. Recent state court cases
challenging such powers have disregarded equal protection developments.9 0 The recent federal case of Little Thunder v. South
Dakota,91 however, has applied the teachings of Kramer and
" The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), makes punishable that
conduct within federal territorial jurisdiction, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1970), that is not
otherwise punishable under federal law, if the conduct "would be punishable if committed
• . .within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place
is situated . .. ."
0 398 U.S. at 424.
S'Id.
Id. at 426.
"
"States do have latitude in determining whether certain public officials shall be selected by election or chosen by appointment and whether various questions shall be submitted to the voters." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969).
" See, e.g., City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975) (zoning
regulation); State ex rel. Pat Griffin Co. v. City of Butte, 151 Mont. 546, 445 P.2d 739 (1968)
(business regulation).
518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Cornman to condemn the extension of full governmental control
unaccompanied by extension of the franchise. The Little Thunder
decision brings to the fore the question whether the exercise of more
limited extraterritorial powers can survive equal protection scrutiny.
A.

Little Thunder

Little Thunder involved a challenge to South Dakota statutes
that provided for extraterritorial governance. Under South Dakota
law, "unorganized counties"-designated geographical areas of the
state that lack county governments-were subject to the jurisdiction of officials of a neighboring organized county. 2 Officials of the
organized counties exercised considerable power over the unorganized counties. They could enact rural zoning regulations, control
highway use, establish parks and libraries, supervise fiscal affairs,
levy and collect taxes, and dispatch police with the power of arrest.9 3
County legislative boards, sheriffs, auditors, treasurers, coroners,
and prosecutors had full power over thousands of people in the
unorganized areas. Residents of these areas, however, could not vote
for county officials. 4 Residents of the unorganized counties brought
a class action in federal district court challenging the statutes that
prevented them from voting. The district court rejected their claims
and upheld the statutes.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district
court had erred in applying the "rational basis" test to the residency
requirements. Limitations on the franchise in elections "of general
interest," the court held, are instead subject to the stringent
"compelling state interest" test. 5 Consistently with Cornman, the
court peremptorily dismissed South Dakota's assertion that lack of
residency alone furnished a sufficient state interest to justify denial
of the vote99 and proceeded to test the geographic distinction for
,zS.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 7-17-1 (1967) (providing for "attachment" of unorganized
counties to adjacent organized counties); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 7-17-3 (1967) (granting
county commissioners of organized counties all the powers in unorganized counties which
they may ordinarily exercise in the county that elected them).
'3 518 F.2d at 1256-57.
'" The disenfranchisement of the plaintiffs in county elections, required by S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 12-23-2 (1974), was explicit and almost complete. However, other statutes
specifically authorized the plaintiffs to participate in the election of the county school board,
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-23-3 (1974), and highway officials, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 13-8-1 (1974). They could also vote in all local, state, and federal elections. See 518 F.2d at
1254-55, 1255 n.3.
'5 518 F.2d at 1255.
S The court noted the observation in Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975), that "any
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correlation with South Dakota's interest in excluding from the franchise insufficiently interested or affected voters. After canvassing
the range of powers exercised by the organized counties over the
citizens of the unorganized, the court easily concluded that the
plaintiffs possessed a sufficiently substantial interest in the election
of county officials.17 The state's final argument in justification, that
the appellants were denied the vote only because they had not exercised their statutory right to organize county governments,98 was
also easily dismissed; the plaintiffs' opportunity to form an organized county in the future, the court stated, "does not vitiate their
present interest in their present county government" to a degree
that justified exclusion from the vote." The court concluded that
"although a state might constitutionally set up bona fide geographic
lines as they relate to the organization of local government," it
cannot use residency requirements to "disenfranchise citizens who
have a substantial interest in the choice of who will function as their
elected officials."100
The Little Thunder decision confirms a point suggested by
Kramer and Cornman: Where classifications for voting purposes are
challenged, "citizen interest" analysis usually exhausts judicial inquiry. Although Cornman intimated that a limitation on the right
to vote might be justified by a state interest other than that of
denying the vote to citizens who are substantially less interested in
or affected by electoral decisions than others, it is difficult to imagine what other state interests might be articulated. Indeed, the goal
of limiting the franchise to citizens primarily interested in the electoral decision was the only state interest seriously considered in
Kramer, Cornman, and Little Thunder.
classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship
cannot stand unless the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a
compelling state interest," yet treated the residence requirement as a classification to be
closely scrutinized. The court relied on Common for the proposition that geographic residence
limitations "must bear a close relationship to the underlying interest of the parties affected
in the results of the elective process." 518 F.2d at 1256.
518 F.2d at 1256.

"

Under state law residents of unorganized counties could organize a county or attach
themselves to an existing county, but only if one-half the voters were freeholders. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 7-4-2 (1967). Since most of the residents of the unorganized counties were
American Indians living on reservations, it was practically impossible for them to organize.
The court suggested the statutory requirement was tantamount to property requirements that
have been overturned by the Supreme Court. 518 F.2d at 1258 n.6.
" Id. at 1258.
gs

10Id. at 1256.
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Exercises of Limited Extraterritorial Powers

Only one equal protection challenge to the extraterritorial exercise of limited governmental powers by an elective unit has been
decided by a federal court. That challenge was brought in Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa.' 0' Residents of Holt, Alabama, an unincorporated community on the outskirts of Tuscaloosa, are, under
two Alabama statutes, subject to the "police jurisdiction" of the
abutting city,"'2 and, under another statute, to the city's power to
license and regulate businesses. 0 3 Residents of Holt brought suit in
federal court seeking injunctive relief against continued enforcement of the state statutes, which, they argued, disenfranchised
them in violation of the Constitution's equal protection guarantees.
A three-judge district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that extraterritorial regulation is not "unconstitutional
per se" under equal protection doctrine. 04 The court distinguished
Little Thunder on the curious ground that the plaintiffs were seeking not an extension of the franchise, as did the Little Thunder
plaintiffs, but injunctive relief against extraterritorial regulation.' '
The facts in Holt seem to provide the basis for an excellent test
case. One statute contested in Holt delegates to cities the size of
Tuscaloosa extraterritorial "police jurisdiction," ' including the
power to enforce "ordinances. . . enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for violation thereof
...
,207 A second statute, uncontested in the Holt action, empowers Tuscaloosa to plan and control subdivisions within five miles of
the city limits."°' Another statute vests the municipal court with
jurisdiction in criminal matters"9 arising in the city's police jurisdiction, and with the power to "impose the penalties prescribed by
ordinance for the violation of ordinances and by-laws of the city"
"'1 Civ. Action No. 73-M-736 (N.D. Ala. June 7, 1977) (three-judge district court), appeal
docketed, No. 77-515 (U.S. 1977).
1802
ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975) (conferring "police jurisdiction"), § 12-14-10 (1975) (con-

ferring jurisdiction upon the municipal court), and § 11-51-91 (1975) (allowing the city to
license businesses in its police jurisdiction). An Alabama court has interpreted the predecessor of § 11-51-91 as an amendment to § 11-40-10 which specifies some of the police powers
available to the city for extraterritorial use. Town of Graysville v. Johnson, 33 Ala. App. 479,
34 So. 2d 708 (1948).
" ALA. CODE § 11-51-91 (1975).
''
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, Civ. Action No. 73-M-736 (N.D. Ala. June 7,
1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-515 (U.S. 1977).
103Id.
104ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975).
107 Id.
lO
'H

ALA.
ALA.

CODE §
CODE §

11-52-30 (1975).
12-14-10 (1975).
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occurring within the police jurisdiction."' Yet another statute authorizes the Commission Board to "fix and collect licenses for any
business, trade, or profession" within the police jurisdiction, although license fees for extraterritorial businesses are limited to onehalf the amount charged comparable in-city businesses.",
The constitutionality of the exercise of such governmental powers over extraterritorials is a difficult question. As demonstrated
above, the test is whether the denial of the vote is justified by a
compelling state interest. The facts of Little Thunder presented a
comparatively easy case because residents of South Dakota's unorganized counties were subject to the full governmental powers of the
organized counties. Under the Alabama statutes involved in the
Holt case, however, the extraterritorials are not subject to the full
scope of municipal powers; the enfranchised residents of Tuscaloosa
are subject to certain important governmental powers-such as taxation,"' eminent domain,3 and zoning'"-that are not exercised
beyond the city limits.
Whether residents of an area subject to the governmental powers of an elective local unit are so much less interested in the electoral decision, or, what is the same, sufficiently less affected by the
powers of the local unit, to justify exclusion from the vote can perhaps be determined by comparing the interests at stake with those
discussed in the Supreme Court's cases. The facts of Holt, for example, can be compared with the facts of Comman."5 The factors
which the Court in that case cited in support of its conclusion that
the residents of the NIH enclave were substantially interested in
state elections included the applicability of state criminal law, the
amenability to the process of the state courts, the power of the state

118
ALA. CODE § 12-14-1(b) (1975). The ordinances referred to are those enacted by the
city's legislative body, the Commission Board, on which the residents of Holt are not represented.
.ALA.
CODE § 11-51-91 (1975).
2 One power that can be exercised by a city government within its boundaries, the
power to tax, is not exercisable extraterritorially. Municipalities are, however, entitled to
collect "license taxes" in their extraterritorial jurisdictions. See text and note at note 51-53
supra. See also City of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 368, 17 So. 2d 451, 454 (1944)
(distinguishing between use of license fees for revenue purposes, which is not permissible, and
their use for regulatory purposes, which is); Atlantic Oil Co. v. Town of Steele, 283 Ala. 56,
58, 214 So. 2d 331, 333 (1968) (making same distinction).
11 ALA. CODE § 18-1-1 (1975).
2 Although the terms "police and sanitary regulations" in ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975)
might seem to permit extraterritorial zoning as an exercise of the police power, the Supreme
Court of Alabama ruled in 1970 that the power to zone extraterritorially was not granted by
the statute. Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233 So. 2d 69 (1970).
"I Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970), discussed in text and notes at notes 8088 supra.
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to regulate automobile use, and the power of the state to levy and
collect taxes other than property taxes."' The residents of Holt are
subject to many analogous powers of the city of Tuscaloosa: the
city's ordinances," 7 the jurisdiction of its municipal court, 8 and the
several varieties of business licensing."' On the whole, the Holt
situation does not seem to present an imbalance of resident and
non-resident interests any or much greater than that in the
Cornman case. The only major distinction between the two cases is
that the residents of the federal enclosure in Cornman, unlike the
residents of Holt, were subject to some (though not all) tax burdens
imposed on the residents of the contiguous entity. Relative financial
stake, however, should not be a factor of overriding importance
where excluded voters have other important interests. In Kramer
the Court struck down a qualification for voting in school district
elections based on real property holdings, 20 even though the property tax was the only local source of school financing. 2'
,6 Id. at 424.
ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (1975).
, ALA. CODE § 12-14-1(b) (1975).
1" AA. CODE § 11-51-91 (1975).
,2*
The statute challenged in Kramer, N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 2012 (McKinney 1969), now
amended (Supp. 1976), provided that citizens of the United States, age twenty-one years or
older, could vote in school district elections, if they either owned or leased, or were the spouse
of an owner or lessee, of real property, or if they were the parent or guardian of a school-age
child.
121Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 638 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). The Court has recognized that greatly disproportional financial stake justifies
limitations on the franchise expressed in terms of property qualifications in cases concerning
the right to vote in special limited purpose district elections. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 473 (1973). In both Salyer and Toltec, however, the Court
majority applied the less stringent "rational basis" test because the entities involved did not
perform "normal governmental activities"-an exception suggested by a dictum in the
Hadley case. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 72730 (1973).
The kinds of extraterritorial powers discussed in this comment, see Section II supra,
apparently all fit within the category of "governmental" powers as defined by Supreme Court
cases on voting rights. The extraterritorial powers granted municipalities more nearly resemble those found within the reach of the fourteenth amendment, such as operation of a school
district, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), a junior college
district, Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), or a power company, Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970),
than they resemble entities found to be without serious governmental powers, such as a water
district, Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973);
Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 473 (1973), an
advisory council of governments, Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore, 503 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109 (1975), an off-track betting corporation, Slisz v. Western
Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.N.Y. 1974), or a retired teachers'
pension plan, Tron v. Cordello, 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1190-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

ExtraterritorialPowers

1977]

Even in those cases in which the disparity of interest is very
great, the denial of the franchise might nevertheless violate equal
protection. For one thing, the Court has never unequivocally announced that the desire of a governmental unit of general powers to
distinguish between classes of citizens on the basis of significant
disparities in interest constitutes a compelling state interest."'
Moreover, cases such as Holt present a situation markedly unlike
the cases the Court has faced. In cases such as Kramer and Salyer,
involving the validity of property limitations on the right to vote in
elections for special purpose entities, the crucial issue is whether the
excluded citizens are sufficiently unaffected by the unit's discharge
of its single function. In the case of extraterritorial powers, the disparity of interest derives from the unit's exercise of powers over
residents that it does not exercise over extraterritorials. The extraterritorials, however, are as much affected by the specific powers
exercised over them as are the residents of the municipality. It could
be argued that even if the Constitution does not demand that extraterritorials have an equal voice in municipal elections, neither does
it permit complete disenfranchisement on matters in which they
have an interest equal to that of residents.
Cases such as Holt seem sufficiently like Cornman to warrant
the conclusion that denial of the franchise denies equal protection
of the laws. Less expansive grants of power over non-voting extraterritorials present the truly hard case. While an elective local government has a very strong and legitimate interest in denying an equal
voice in its affairs to citizens who are unaffected by the bulk of the
unit's actions and decisions, it does not follow that it has a compelling interest in governing residents of contiguous areas. The determination of that question instead turns on whether there exist alternatives to extraterritorial government that both protect the unincorporated area's residents' right to a voice in their governance and
serve the state's interests in regulating unincorporated areas.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT

Examination of the alternatives to extraterritorial government
is important for two reasons. First, as pointed out above, the availa'"The Court in Cornman said: "Without deciding the question we have assumed that
[the interest in limiting the franchise to citizens primarily concerned] could be sufficiently

compelling to justify limitations on the suffrage, at least with regard to some elections." 398
U.S. at 422. The Court has ruled that such an interest can afford a rational basis for voter
classifications. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 473
(1973).
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bility of feasible alternatives to present extraterritorial governance
will be highly relevant in determining in any particular case
whether the elective local government-or the state as its principal-has a compelling interest in denying the franchise to extraterritorials over whom it asserts limited governmental powers. Second,
municipal governments whose exercise of extraterritorial powers
violates equal protection may not desire, and indeed may not be
constitutionally permitted, £23 to extend full voting rights to extraterritorials.
Because of the wide variation in the extent and kinds of extraterritorial powers delegated, the question of how and whether the
denial of representation can be remedied is not susceptible to any
universal answer. The alternatives set forth below strike a middle
ground between denying the vote to extramunicipal residents and
extending them full voting rights in municipal elections.
A. Reversion of Control over Unincorporated Areas to the State
Legislature
If existing statutes delegating extraterritorial control to cities
were repealed or struck down, the delegated powers would automatically revert to the state legislature that originally granted them.
The legislature could then enact laws replacing the city ordinances
formerly applicable to these areas. Enforcement of these laws
might, however, present serious problems. State police, who are
'3 Indeed, recent federal cases suggest the interesting question of whether full enfranchisement of extraterritorials might violate equal protection. In several cases federal courts
have faced the claim that overextension of the franchise denies "primarily interested" voters
equal protection of the laws. In two such cases, the courts held that the franchise was not
overinclusive, essentially because the challenged voters had an identifiable substantial interest in the government to be elected. Creel v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 797 (1977) (upholding right of city dwellers to vote in elections for a separate
county school board); Clark v. Town of Greenburgh, 436 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1971) (constitution
of 5% of town's tax base and other connections with the town gave county residents too
substantial a interest to permit disenfranchisement). In Locklear v. North Carolina State Bd.
of Elections, 514 F.2d 1152 (4th Cir. 1975), however, the court held that allowing city residents
to vote for the county school board unconstitutionally diluted the votes of non-city residents,
because the interests of the city residents resulted largely from non-mandatory contracts
between the county and city boards. The court found no "compelling state interest" to justify
the state's dilution of county voters. Id. at 1155. It is interesting to speculate what standard
the court would have applied if the situation were reversed; if the city voters were denied the
franchise and sued to have their right to vote recognized. Wherever one group's vote is not
"diluted," the other group's vote is denied. In Creel v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 797 (1977), the court found that the alleged "dilution" of the vote was
not "irrational" or "wholly irrelevant," id. at 288, but that the proposed denial of the vote to
city dwellers might not satisfy the "compelling state interest" standard. Id. The Creel court,
however, explained the different result in Locklear on the basis of factual differences. Id. at
289.
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ordinarily charged with enforcement of state laws, would be hard
pressed to enforce new state laws dealing with particular ills that
require almost constant supervision. Enforcement of regulations on
zoning, disorderly conduct, and refuse disposal, for example, might
be practically impossible unless state police were permanently assigned to unincorporated areas for just those purposes. This could
impose considerable financial burdens on states where much land
remains unincorporated.
Reversion of control to state legislatures would also diminish
the possibility of direct cooperation between cities and adjacent
unincorporated territory. Both regions may suffer because of a lack
of coordinated control over contiguous areas. Zoning and sanitary
regulations governing the city's outer edge, for example, might be
rendered virtually worthless if the activities they seek to regulate or
forbid were permitted directly across city lines on unincorporated
land. If the legislature chose to regulate such matters in unincorporated areas, city representatives would have to negotiate with state
officials lacking familiarity with local conditions. Moreover, the
costs of negotiating on such particulars with representatives of every
city adjoining an unincorporated area might prove prohibitive.
In spite of these disadvantages, reversion of control to the
legislature may be a desirable option. Although this approach might
amount to no practical control, an absence of control may be
unobjectionable in some situations. If, as one commentator suggests, extraterritorial powers are rarely used,' 24 it could be they are
not needed at all. Some types of extramunicipal regulation, such as
zoning and subdivision controls, might simply be unnecessary beyond municipal boundaries. Other types of controls can be effected
by state law and enforced by municipal police.'2 5 Such a scheme
would not violate the fourteenth amendment since the local police
would be acting in the place of state police. Their duties would be
administrative and not legislative in nature.
Reliance on the residual power of the legislature to control otherwise ungoverned areas would entail the creation of no special bureaucracy and the taking of no irreversible steps. This lack-ofcontrol option is especially viable in states where developing exurban areas can be annexed easily and thus subjected to city zoning
12

F.

SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE MUNICIPAL AREA

'= Statutes of this kind are in force in North
GEN. STAT. § 160A-286 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §

65-66 (1962).

Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. N.C.
6-609 (1971); VA. CODE § 19.2-250 (1975).
See Kelley v. County of Brunswick, 200 Va. 45, 104 S.E.2d 7 (1958) (explaining the Virginia
statute's purposes and effects).
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and subdivision regulations as necessary. 121 It also could serve as a
starting point from which other alternatives could be implemented
as needed.
Active Management by State Officials

B.

A state may exercise its authority over unincorporated areas
through an appointed body or individual. 27 Such an official or board
would not be subject to undue influence by city (as opposed to noncity) residents and could therefore effectuate the state's legitimate
interests, such as assuring compatibility of city and extracity regulations on certain subjects, while protecting extramunicipal residents from the excessive demands of city interests.
Such a system has been used in Vermont since 1862.125 Under
the Vermont statutes, the governor every two years appoints a
"supervisor" for all gores (unincorporated regions) in each county.
The supervisor collects state taxes and performs general governmental functions.' 29 The supervisor is also empowered to appoint a planning commission for all the gores in his county.'30 This scheme,
which would permit planning, subdivision approval, and zoning for
unincorporated areas, presents no constitutional difficulties. The
concept might even be extended so that other services, such as
police and fire protection, would be provided. The Vermont plan
could be used without cost to the state, because it provides for a
method of local tax assessment and collection and thus allows exurban residents to assume the financial burdens of their own government.' 3' Adoption of the plan would remove a financial burden from
city governments that perform extraterritorial chores yet cannot
32
collect corresponding taxes.'
,21This is not to suggest, however, that current state laws on annexation or merger are
free from fourteenth amendment problems. On this subject, see Hagman &Disco, One-Man
One-Vote as a ConstitutionalImperative for Needed Reform of Incorporationand Boundary
Change Laws, 2 URBAN LAW. 459 (1970). See also Kelley v. Mayor and Council, 314 A.2d 208
(Del. Ch. 1973), afj'd, 327 A.2d 749 (Del. 1974) (invalidating a municipal annexation of
unincorporated land because a statutory voting scheme violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause).
' If neither municipal residents nor extraterritorials were permitted to vote on matters
that concerned the latter there could be no equal protection objections to the arrangement.
M VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1401-1409 (1975).
12

Id.

'~

Id. § 4327(e).
In collecting taxes, the Vermont supervisor cooperates with appraisers appointed by

''

the state tax commissioner, subject to gubernatorial approval. Id. §§ 1402, 1406-08.
"I Statutes authorizing cities to exercise powers beyond their limits almost universally
fail to allow taxation to support that exercise. The exceptions to this general rule pertain to
licensing and regulating extramunicipal businesses. See, e.g.,

MONT.

REv. CODES ANN. § 11-
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One of the major purposes of extraterritorial delegationsensuring compatible land use through extraterritorial zoning and
subdivision-could also be achieved. Although the Vermont statutes do not require such cooperation, the goal of uniform development could be incorporated into statute, leaving the degree and
manner of cooperation to the officials involved. Alternatively, the
statute could require supervisors of unincorporated areas to consult
officials of nearby cities, and vice versa, in making zoning and subdivision plans. 13 As a third route to achieving compatible land uses,
the statute could allow neighboring governments (whether or not
incorporated) to appear as parties in interest during the considera134
tion and appeal of zoning and subdivision plans.
C.

Active Management at the County Level

Just as a fairly apportioned state legislature can constitutionally govern unincorporated areas directly, so can an elected, fairly
apportioned county legislature. If a state has an operating network
of county governments, 35 use of county government to manage unincorporated areas may be a more desirable alternative than direct
government by the state legislature because of the latter's remoteness from local problems and the relative unimportance to the state
of purely local issues. Several states have already delegated to
county governments authority of the type ordinarily delegated to
cities.'36 Maryland, for example, authorizes some counties to estab918 (1968); White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932) (interpreting the
predecessor of ALA. CODE § 11-51-91 (1975)). Apparently, however, at least one state has
allowed its cities to collect fees as a precedent to plat approval, despite the absence of an
explicit statutory authorization to do so. The extent to which other states allow this, or would
allow it, is unclear. See Prudential Co-operative Realty Co. v. City of Youngstown, 118 Ohio
St. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928) (allowing collection of such fees of $5 or less; if fees were greatly
in excess of inspection costs, they would be invalid as excise taxes). But cf. Newport Building
Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962); Sanchez v. City
of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); National Realty Corp. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 209 Va. 172, 163 S.E.2d 154 (1968) (all denying the cities' authority to collect a fee as
a condition precedent to plat approval, even when the platted land is located within the city).
"3 An approach similar to that suggested is used in California. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §
66453 (West Supp. 1977).
'3 In Rhode Island, neighboring municipalities are permitted to appear as parties in
interest in any proceeding concerning the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance
which will affect land on which the two abut. Such municipalities are given the same standing
and rights as a landowner located within the amending or adopting municipality. R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 45-24-4.2 (1970).
"I Vermont has no county level of government.
13' See, e.g., Amz. Rv. STAT. § 11-251 (Supp. 1977) (adopt health and police regulations);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16100 (West 1964) (license businesses); GA. CODE § 23-1401 (1975)
(appoint police); IOWA CODE ANN. § 332.3 (West 1977) (inter alia, catch dogs, establish a
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lish and operate a police force, abate nuisances, control refuse disposal, and issue plumbing, zoning and building permits and regulations. 37 Such powers could be delegated to county governments only
for unincorporated areas, rather than for the entire county as the
Maryland statute provides.'3 8
Indiana provides another model of county governance. That
state empowers county advisory planning commissions to serve the
city as well, at the discretion of the city council.131 Under a similar
type of plan, a city could permit the county to exercise governmental power over it to the extent that it sees uniformity of regulation
in any particular area as desirable. For example, a city might allow
county governments to prescribe zoning regulations, while retaining
jurisdiction for all other purposes.4 0
D.

Management by Special Purpose Government

In states where county governments do not exist or in situations
where the need for civic cooperation transcends county as well as
city lines, creation of a special governmental unit by the state legislature may be the preferred alternative. One current example of a
multi-purpose special government is the Boston area's Metropolitan
District Commission (MDC). Under the Boston plan, the governor
of Massachusetts appoints commissioners who have jurisdiction for
various limited purposes over a number of municipalities in the
greater Boston area.' The MDC performs several governmental
functions. It exercises the power of eminent domain, operates a
building code, maintain and improve cemeteries); Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-3-41 (1972) (regulate
use and sale of fireworks).
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 3 (1973).
'1 If the county governments performed governmental functions only in unincorporated
areas, such a delegation might be constitutionally infirm were city residents allowed to vote
in county elections. Conversely, if the county government performed governmental functions
in both cities and unincorporated areas, it might be impermissible not to allow city residents
to vote in county elections. See note 123 supra. However, it can be said with assurance that
it would not violate the fourteenth amendment if only residents of unincorporated areas voted
in county elections and the county government so elected performed governmental functions
only in the unincorporated areas; similarly, it would be permissible to allow both city residents and residents of unincorporated areas to vote in county elections if the county government performed the same governmental functions in the city and unincorporated areas.
"'

IND. CODE

ANN. § 18-7-5-25 (Burns 1974).

Given the apparent preoccupation of some states with cemetery regulation, see text
and notes at notes 24-27 supra,it may be worth drawing special attention to the Maine statute
designed to deal with this problem. It charges county commissioners with responsibility for
maintaining cemeteries in unincorporated areas. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 13, § 1103 (1974). Presumably these responsibilities could be enlarged to include whatever other kinds of regulation
a state considered necessary.
"' MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 28, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1975); id. ch. 92.
"'
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police force with limited powers, and regulates water, sewage, and
recreation facilities.4 2 A special government district modeled on the
MDC might exercise police, sanitary, zoning, and subdivision authority in a number of towns and unincorporated areas. Its commissioner could be elected by the people served or, as in the Boston
example, appointed by the governor.
Although such a unit might effect a saving of funds through
consolidation of the efforts of several communities, the reasons for
its use would have to be sufficiently compelling to justify the establishment of an entirely new governmental structure. In many areas
low population density and lack of industrial or commercial development in unincorporated areas make such a concept an unrealistic
and expensive alternative. Furthermore, since any such special purpose government would have to be empowered to lay and collect its
own taxes," 3 this alternative would be feasible only where there
exists a relatively even distribution of taxable resources in the area
to be governed; otherwise, the residents of the municipality would
likely bear a disproportionately heavy tax burden.
A less ambitious form of special purpose government for zoning
and subdivision control is the area planning commission used in
Indiana.' The Indiana scheme provides for state appointment of an
area-wide advisory commission. The commission develops a unified
plan for regional development, including zoning ordinances. Costs
of such a planning commission might be defrayed by populationbased contributions from the participating governments."' While
this plan relies upon voluntary municipal cooperation and therefore
cannot assure adequately controlled development throughout the
district, it may provide a means of guiding development in a rural
area or in an area centered around a single small city where no
effective general-purpose county government exists.
E.

Management at the Local Level

As a final alternative to extraterritorial delegation of municipal
power, unincorporated areas could be permitted to govern themselves, at least in some matters. New Hampshire grants this power
142Id.
14

The MDC collects assessments from its participating municipalities based on the

amount of services rendered. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 92, §§ 1A, 5, 5A, 5B, 6, 7, 8 (Mi-

chie/Law. Co-op, 1975, as amended, Supp. 1976); id. §§ 26, 58, 59, 59A (1975).
"' IND. CODE ANN. §§ 18-7-4-1-99 (Burns 1974).
1 Indiana law requires county participation as a condition precedent to the formation
of such a commission. IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-4-6 (Burns 1974). The county government then
pays all commission expenses. Id. at § 18-7-4-29.
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to unincorporated areas.'45 Perhaps government by the citizenry of
such an entity might produce some rudimentary form of police protection;'4 7 in all likelihood, however, were residents of an unincorporated area numerous or interested enough to pass and enforce
police, sanitary, zoning and subdivision regulations, they would incorporate and do so.
CONCLUSION

Modern equal protection developments suggest that the exercise of extraterritorial powers by elective local government units
may be constitutionally infirm. Local voter classifications, including geographic classifications, must be evaluated under the strict
scrutiny test. Thus, the legitimacy of a voter classification turns on
whether the interest of excluded citizens in a unit's electoral decisions is so insubstantial in comparison with that of the included
citizens that the classification can be said to promote a compelling
state interest. Applying this test, a court of appeals in Little Thunder v. South Dakota struck down South Dakota statutes which
granted organized counties extensive governmental powers over
unorganized counties. Extraterritorial extensions of full police
power, as authorized, for example, in Idaho and North Dakota, are
virtually indistinguishable from the arrangements condemned in
Little Thunder.
Most delegations of extraterritorial power, however, are far
more limited. In many cases in which municipalities exercise something less than the full police power extraterritorially, the comparative insubstantiality of impact on extraterritorials might justify the
refusal to extend the full franchise. The disparity of interest argument should not, however, conclude the equal protection inquiry.
No Supreme Court case answers the question whether a voter classification tailored to reflect a substantial disparity of citizen interest
can survive equal protection scrutiny where the classification results
in denying any voice to voting-age citizens permanently subject to
the exercise of some governmental power by an elective local unit.
Under the strict scrutiny standard, the constitutionality of such
arrangements should turn on the availability of alternatives to complete disenfranchisement.
This comment has outlined a number of alternatives to extraterritorial government. Each alternative has its strengths and weak,, N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 53:1-7 (1970).
,4 See id. at §§ 53:2-6.
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nesses; none will suit every situation. Nevertheless, a state or locality probably can combine features of the various alternatives in
order to fashion a suitable means of governing areas now subject to
various forms of control by contiguous municipalities. If this is so,
all but de minimis forms of extraterritorial control are in danger of
invalidation.
David E. Hunt

